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THE GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT OF
1994-AN UPDATE*
ORLA M. BRADY, EsQ.**
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE GENERAL AVIATION Revitalization Act ("GARA") stat-
ute, and its judicial interpretation, generates many fans and
foes. One can find ample arguments on either side of the fence
for support or criticism on the issue of GARA. Like any good
political argument, there are statistics, figures, and public policy
debates that support both sides.' Tort reform is a hot issue but,
GARA is unique. GARA has been called "the envy of every man-
ufacturing industry with ongoing product liability exposure" be-
cause there are no other manufacturing statutes like it 2 GARA
is a young statute and its continued development through emer-
gent interpretation will be an interesting ride. In this review, I
will focus on some provisions and exceptions to the GARA stat-
* This article was written before the decision in Sheesle, v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
which is a pivotal GARA case. Please see Sheesiry v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. Civ. 02-
4185-KES, 2006 WI. 1084103 (D.S.D. Apr. 20, 2006).
** Ms. Brady, J.D., LL.M., is a Massachusetts and Illinois licensed attorney
working with the plaintiff's aviation law firm, Nolan Law Group, Chicago, IL.
The views contained herein are solely those of the author.
See %vw.gama.aero or w,.generalaviation.org for statistics and argument
on the successes and advancements made since the passage of GARA. Specifi-
cally, see Gen. Aviation Mfrs. Ass'n [GAMA], A Report to the President and Con-
gress on the General Aviation Revitalization Act: Five Year Results (2000), http:/
/www.gama.aero/pubs/getfile.php?cataloglD=1 1. Also, see James F. Rodriguez,
Tort Reform & GARA: Is Repose Incompatible with Safety?, 47 ARIz. L. Rix. 577
(2005), for an interesting debate looking at both sides of the argument for and
against GARA. See also Nathan J. Rice, The General Aviation Revitalization Act of
1994: A Ten-Year Retrospective, 2004 Wis. L. Rtv. 945, 970 (2004) ("Despite the best
intentions of many who supported it, GARA has proven itself to be grossly unfair
to airplane crash victims.").
2 See Phillipj. Kolczynski, GARA: A Status Relport, AVwVB, Jan. 14, 2001, http://
w ,.axweb.com/news/avlaw/181905-1 ("Automobile, boat and recreational vehi-
cle manufacturers have no immunity for their products. No matter how old their
products get or how long the product exceeds its intended useful life, its manu-
facturer can still be sued.").
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ute and how those issues are currently playing out in courts
today.
II. BRIEF HISTORY
Between 1978 and 1988, employment in the aviation industry
fell sixty-five percent.3 Between 1984 and 1994, the year GARA
was signed, aircraft shipments declined ninety-five percent.
4
Cessna Aircraft Company stopped making single engine air-
craft.5 Some believed the general aviation industry was headed
for sure failure and attributed the decline directly to large
awards granted in personal injury and wrongful death general
aviation cases.6
Proponents of GARA looked to a federal statute of repose as a
potential solution to the declining aviation industry.7 Those
proponents cried out for legislation revitalizing the industry,
and GARA was born.
The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 mandates an
eighteen-year statute of repose, 8 precluding lawsuits against gen-
eral aviation aircraft and new aircraft component part manufac-
turers for those parts that replace older parts.9 The statute
provides a "rolling provision" that restarts the period of repose
at the addition of a new component part added to the aircraft,
but only as to that particular part and not the entire plane. 10
GARA also provides four clearly defined exceptions, one of




6 See The Competitiveness of the U.S. Aircraft Manufacturing Industry: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm. On Transp. & Infrastructure, 106th Cong.
(2001). This hearing outlines the examination of the vitality of the U.S. general
aviation aircraft manufacturing industry and its competitiveness, with an eye to
improving competitiveness in the industry. The review provides a thorough out-
line of the aviation workforce, current industrial concerns, financial aspects, and
international trade.
7 "GARA sought to ease the manufacturers' liability burden and help reverse
an ongoing decline in domestic general aviation aircraft production." Nathan J.
Rice, The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994: A Ten-Year Retrospective, 2004
Wis. L. REv. 945, 946 (2004). This article provides a critical comment on GARA's
harsh results. It mentions that GARA is effective in barring lawsuits while not
restoring the annual production of aircraft to its peak. Id. at 969.
8 General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, §§ 2 - 3,
108 Stat. 1552 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2000)) [hereinafter General
Aviation Revitalization Act].
9 See id. § 2.
10 Id. §§ 2(a), 3(3).
which has resulted in interesting case law and intellectual
debate.
III. WHEN DOES THE CLOCK START TICKING?
The statute of repose period begins "ticking" upon the deliv-
ery of an aircraft or component part to a purchaser, lessee, or
someone engaged in the business."l The Ninth Circuit con-
firmed that whether or not the plane was flying its entire life as a
private general aviation aircraft is irrelevant: if the plane started
in military service, the repose period starts ticking from the first
date of delivery.12 "GARA ... refers only to delivery of the air-
craft, not delivery of the general aviation aircraft."'"
A "general aviation aircraft" is defined as the following:
[A] ny aircraft for which a type certificate or an airworthiness cer-
tificate has been issued by the Administrator of the Federal Avia-
tion Administration, which, at the time such certificate was
originally issued, had a maximum seating capacity of fewer than
20 passengers, and which was not, at the time of the accident,
engaged in scheduled passenger-carrying operations. 4
It is important to note that although GARA is a federally
based statute of repose, it does not create federal jurisdiction.
In Wright v. Bond-Air, Ltd.,' 5 the defendant's claim that GARA
was a federally based statute confirming federal subject matter
jurisdiction failed." The Michigan court held that GARA is not
a federal claim and thus neither confers federal jurisdiction
upon state court claims nor creates a federal cause of action.17
A. "ROLLING PROVISION"
One of GARA's most significant provisions is its rolling provi-
sion. The provision mandates tolling of the repose period:
II d. § 2 (a) (1) (A) -(B).
12 Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 283 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.
2002) ("Therefore, Appellee argues, the period of repose only begins to run on
military surplus aircraft at the time at which those aircraft receive type and air-
worthiness certificates and thereby become general aviation aircraft. The plain
language of GARA, however, supports Bell Helicopter's position that the limita-
tions period is triggered by the initial delivery of the aircraft, even if the aircraft
cannot be considered a general aviation aircraft at that time.").
1-3 Id. (citing General Aviation Revitalization Act § 2(a) (1) (A).).
14 General Aviation Revitalization Act § 2(c).
15Wright v. Bond-Air, Ltd., 930 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
i6 Id. at 304-05.
17 Id.
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(2) with respect to any new component, system, subassembly, or
other part which replaced another component, systems, subas-
sembly, or other part originally in, or which was added to, the
aircraft, and which is alleged to have caused such death, injury,
or damage, after the applicable limitation period beginning on
the date of completion of the replacement or addition.'"
In summary, when a new part or component is added, the re-
pose period begins to run from the date of installation, but runs
only to that part added.' 9
Interpretation of this provision has resulted in interesting
case law and debate over many different arguments: Does an
overhaul restart the GARA clock? What if the part is only a com-
ponent of that part which caused the accident? What is a "prod-
uct" sufficient to begin retolling the statute with respect to that
product?
One of the earlier analyses with respect to defining "product"
sufficient to toll the repose period was Alter v. Bell Helicopter.2"
Alter involved a helicopter crash in Israel in 1993, allegedly
caused by an engine failure. 21 All parties agreed that the date of
delivery of the helicopter and accident date were more than
eighteen years apart.22 The plaintiff tried to circumvent GARA
by claiming that maintenance manuals for the problem engine
had been issued within the eighteen-year limitation and that the
manuals provided misleading statements that were the proxi-
mate cause of the crash.23 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that
the manual's instruction was faulty because, had it been fol-
lowed, the manual would not enable a mechanic to discover seri-
ous wear and tear of the engine. 24 The court held, inter alia,
that the maintenance instructions were not a "product: and that
their issuance, did not renew the tolling of the statute of
25irepose.
In Lahaye v. Galvin Flying Service,2 6 the court affirmed a lower
court ruling that the overhaul of a trim actuator did not trigger
18 General Aviation Revitalization Act § 2(a) (2).
19 See id. § 2.
20 Alter v. Bell Helicopter, 944 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
21 Id. at 533.
22 See id. at 537.
23 Id. at 537.
24 Id.
2.5 Id. at 538. This decision is also notable because the court held that GARA
applied to crashes in foreign countries. Id. at 541.
26 Lahaye v. Galvin Flying Serv., 144 Fed. Appx. 631 (9th Cir. 2005).
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the GARA rolling provision.2 '7 Focusing on Caldwell,2 ' discussed
below, the court reemphasized that to trigger GARA's rolling
provision, there must have been a "substantive alteration to the
part that was alleged to have proximately caused the accident." -2 9
As with other cases, the plaintiff attempted a two-lane approach.
In several cases, including Lahaye, plaintiffs have attempted to
circumvent GARA, alleging both knowing misrepresentation
and the replacement-part tolling provision. This will be dis-
cussed further below. In Lahaye, the court held that the plaintiff
failed to provide facts that would have invoked the "knowing
misrepresentation" exception because the plaintiff did not pro-
vide "evidence showing that the appellee knowingly or inten-
tionally misrepresented information to the FAA [Federal
Aviation Administration] in gaining certification for the subject
aircraft."3 Courts commonly hold that evidence is clearly re-
quired to utilize the knowing misrepresentation exception. In
Lahaye, the court found that it was just as likely that a mechanic
disassembled the trim actuator and reassembled it inappropri-
ately without the use of the instructions or manuals, thwarting
the plaintiffs efforts to fall within the first exception to GARA.3 l
Caldwell v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp.2 is a significant case be-
cause it is one of the first to hold that a supplemental or revised
flight manual could be considered a "new part" of the helicop-
ter within the meaning of GARA, thereby tolling the repose pe-
riod. Caldwell involved the crash of a sightseeing helicopter
that resulted in fatal injuries to a pilot and passenger and seri-
ous injuries to the second passenger. 4 The helicopter engine
ran out of fuel earlier than the pilot would have expected and
approximately ten minutes short of the destination. 5 The fuel
system design on the aircraft was such that the last two gallons of
fuel were always unusable.36 Naturally, in calculating the
27 Id. at 633.
28 Caldwell v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 230 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2000).
29 Lahaye, 144 Fed. Appx. at 633 (citing Caldwell, 230 F.3d at 1158). The court
further explains that "[t] he replacement of certain components of the trim actu-
ator as a result of [a service bulletin] did not change the allegedly defective as-
pect of the trim actuator's design." Id. at 633.
o Id. at 634.
31 Id.
32 Caldwell, 230 F.3d at 1155.
33 Id at 1157.
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amount of fuel required for the flight, pilots, if unaware of this
nuance, would improperly prepare for fuel. The aircraft was
twenty-three years old.37
The plaintiff alleged that the helicopter's flight manual was
defective because it lacked the proper warning regarding the
two gallons of unusable fuel." The flight manual had been re-
vised several times within the eighteen-year period. 9 Caldwell
was distinguished from other failure to warn cases by the Ninth
Circuit because the plaintiffs claim alleged negligence and
strict liability.4"
In a unique step, the court considered the regulations that
govern the flight manuals. The court looked to the CFR re-
quirement to include a flight manual with each helicopter and
the content of those requirements, such as the manual must
contain "information that is necessary for the safe operation be-
cause of design, operating or handling characteristics."41 The
court found that the manual was a "new part" of "an integral
part of the general aviation aircraft product that a manufacturer
sells ... [and] not a separate, general instructional guide. 4 2
The plaintiff eventually lost on remand to the district court.
The district court found that the defendant's "knowing omis-
sion" of a warning from the flight manual was not an active alter-
ation or deletion and that the plaintiff failed to meet the
requirements imposed by the Ninth Circuit.4 3
Hiser v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.44 is another "rolling provi-
sion case." In this case, the aircraft was delivered one week after
the statute-of-repose period's eighteen-year limitation expired.4 5
Here, however, the plaintiff was successful in showing that the
repose period had tolled as to the replacement part because the
replacement part was the likely cause of the accident giving rise
to the litigation, and the part was installed within the eighteen-





41 Id. at 1157.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1158.
44 Hiser v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 249 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003).
45 Id. at 254.
46 Id. at 258-60.
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a few parts of a larger system starts the rolling limitation period
anew for all parts in a larger system. 
47
B. EXCEPTIONS
The crafters of GARA carved out four distinct exceptions:
(1) if the claimant pleads with specificity the facts necessary to prove,
and proves, that the manufacturer with respect to a type certificate
or airworthiness certificate for, or obligations with respect to con-
tinuing airworthiness of, an aircraft or a component, system, sub-
assembly, or other part of an aircraft knowingly misrepresented to
the Federal Aviation Administration, or concealed or withheld from
the Federal Aviation Administration required information that is
material and relevant to the performance or the maintenance or
operation of such aircraft, or the component, system, subassem-
bly, or other part, that is causally related to the harm which the
claimant allegedly suffered;
(2) if the person for whose injury or death the claim is being
made is a passenger for purposes of receiving treatment for a medical
or other emergency;
(3) if the person for whose injury or death the claim is being
made was not aboard the aircraft at the time of the accident; or
(4) to an action brought under a written warranty enforceable
under law but for the operation of this Act.4"
Each exception is important in its own right, but only the first
listed exception has truly generated a good deal of case law. I
will review the exceptions out of order, saving the knowing mis-
representation/concealment exception for last.
1. Purposes of Receiving Treatment for a Medical or Other
Emergency
This exception to the GARA statute of repose is fairly clear
cut. If a passenger is aboard a flight for emergency or medical
purposes, the GARA statute does not bar the claim.
2. Not Aboard the Aircraft
The third exception to the GARA statute of repose allows a
claim for those individuals that were not aboard the aircraft at
the time of the incident. Claims by individuals injured, or repre-
sentatives of individuals killed, will not be barred by the repose
7 Id. at 257.
48 See General Aviatioii Revitalization Act of § 2(b) (1)-(4) (emphasis added).
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period if they are in an aircraft (arguably not affected by GARA
itself) that is involved in a mid-air collision with an older air-
craft. Claims by individuals on the ground that have suffered
due to an aircraft older than eighteen years that crashes into
their home or property and causes damages will not be barred
by the statute of repose provided by GARA.
3. Written Warranty
The written warranty exception allows for claims where there
is an express warranty extending or eliminating the statute of
repose period provided by GARA. Although there has been case
law discussing whether a written warranty actually existed be-
tween the parties on this issue,49 the author knows of none de-
bating whether those written warranties exists. The exception
provided here is also fairly clear cut.
4. Knowing Misrepresentation/Concealment
Only the knowing misrepresentation/concealment exception
to GARA has generated significant case law. If a victim pleads
"with specificity" and proves that the manufacturer knowingly
misrepresented to the FAA or concealed or withheld from the
FAA information material and relevant, including, for example,
the type or airworthiness certificate, any obligations pertaining
to continued airworthiness, or information pertaining to the
performance or maintenance of the aircraft, its components,
etc., and if such omission is causally related to the victim's claim,
the claimant successfully survives a GARA challenge. The
"knowing misrepresentation or concealment or withholding" ex-
ception has been examined several times over the past year. °
Courts consistently stress the requirement in GARA that victims
must plead facts "with specificity" to attempt success with the
knowing misrepresentation/concealment exception.5
49 Schwarz v. Hawkins & Powers Aviation, Inc., No. 04-CV-195-D, 2005 WL
3776351 (D. Wyo. Apr. 8, 2005); Hinkle v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No 247099, 2004
WL 2413768 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2004); Hiser v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.,
4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 249 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
50 Christopher R. Barth, 2005 SMU Air Law Symposium Recent Developments in
Aviation Law, 70J. AIR L. & COM. 171, 215 (2005).
51 Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., 923 F. Supp. 1453, 1456 (D. Wyo.
1996), rev'd, 929 F. Supp. 380 (D. Wyo. 1996) (quoting General Aviation Revitali-
zation Act § 2(b)(1)) [hereinafter Rickert 1].
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Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. was one of the first
cases to analyze the knowing misrepresentation exception to
GARA. A Mitsubishi MU-2 crashed in 1993, approximately
twenty-one years after Mitsubishi sold the aircraft.5' The plain-
tiff claimed the defendant had knowingly misrepresented and
concealed information from the FAA about the plane's de-icing
system and controllability issues.54 The lower court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment based on the plain-
tiff's failure to produce evidence to support the knowing misrep-
resentation and concealment claim.55 Plaintiff filed a motion to
reconsider based on the defendant having "stonewalled her dis-
covery efforts," and the court allowed additional discovery.
The court referred to the earlier summary judgment dismissal
as a "wake up call" for the plaintiff and stressed that a plaintiff
facing a GARA summary judgment motion cannot simply "cre-
ate a genuine issue of material fact" for negligence or strict lia-
bility but, instead, must produce some evidence of a defendant's
actual knowing misrepresentation or concealment from the
FAA.57 As evidence of misrepresentation and knowing conceal-
ment, the plaintiff provided two detailed affidavits from former
Mitsubishi employees outlining occasions of misrepresentation
and concealment.5 The defendant's vehement assault on the
affidavits proffered by the plaintiff confirmed, for the court, that
a genuine issue of material fact did, in fact, exist.59 The court
established that the affidavits only succeeded in helping the
plaintiff survive summary judgment and emphasized that
52 Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., 929 F. Supp. 380 (D. Wyo. 1996),
rev'g, 923 F. Supp. 1453 (D. Wyo. 1996) [hereinafter Rickert 1I].
53 Rickert I, 923 F. Supp. at 1456.
54 Id. at 1457.
55 Id. at 1462.
56 Rickert II, 929 F. Supp. at 381.
57 (d.
I-5 d. at 382. One affidavit provided that the affiant and other employees "were
aware of many MU-2 accidents, and that they attributed most of these accidents
to ice accretion" and that the "problem was virtually kept within the company
and neither seriously investigated nor disclosed to the public or the [FAA]." Id.
The affiant further provided that he believed the defendant "continues to main-
tain an office in Texas . . . primarily to defend liability and conceal the icing
problem." Id. Another affiant claimed, inter alia, "[t]he problem of horizontal
(tail) plane icing on . . . [the] . . . aircraft was secretly maintained within Mitsub-
ishi, and never properly investigated or disclosed to the public or the [FAA]." Id.
Further "Mitsubishi actively covered-up the problem of horizontal tail plane icing
... during and after the Special Certification Review." Id.
59 Id. at 382.
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"GARA erects a formidable first hurdle.., not only at the sum-
mary judgment stage but also at trial . .. [The plaintiff] must
satisfy GARA's knowing misrepresentation exception, and then
prove her product liability claims."6
Not all plaintiffs lose in GARA battles. One, somewhat recent,
successful use of the knowing misrepresentation exception can
be found in Butler v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.6" Butler involved
a helicopter crash, allegedly due to the failure of a tail rotor
yoke that was older than eighteen years.6 2 The court found that
the knowing misrepresentation and concealment exception ap-
plied because the defendant was aware of failures of the same
yoke but failed to report it to the FAA.63
Another notable case is Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc.,64
where an action was brought against a propeller manufacturer
for damages stemming from injuries in a 1999 plane crash. 65
The plane was older than eighteen years.66 The alleged failure
of the manual to adequately warn aircraft owners of defects in
the propeller blade did not proximately cause the crash, and the
court held that the date of the manual's issuance was irrelevant
as to GARA.67 Also, the court held that the overhaul of the air-
plane propeller did not render it a "new part" for purposes of
GARA.68 The court did, however, outline the elements required
for a successful knowing misrepresentation or concealment ex-
ception: "(1) knowing misrepresentation, or concealment, or
withholding, (2) of required information that is material and
relevant, (3) that is causally related to the harm they suffered. '"69
Another notable case is Hinkle v. Cessna Aircraft Co.70 This case
involved the 1995 crash of a Cessna 421B aircraft that caused
60 Id. at 383-84.
61 Butler v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003).
62 Id. at 764.
63 Id.
64 Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d 631 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
65 Id. at 636 ("Plaintiffs claim.., that the propeller failure was caused by Hart-
zell's negligent design... [and] Hartzell was aware of the propeller's defective
design and misrepresented the design problems to the [FAA].").
66 Id. at 635.
67 Id. at 662.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 647 (citing Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., 923 F. Supp. 1453,
1456 (D. Wyo. 1996)).
70 Hinkle v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 247099, 2004 WL 2413768 (Mich. Ct. App.
Oct. 28, 2004). The court rejected the plaintiffs constitutional challenge to
GARA. Id. at *3.
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fatal injuries to the plaintiffs husband.7' The allegations in-
cluded that the plane's right engine fuel pump failed during the
flight and that the plane had inadequate single-engine perform-
ance capabilities to prevent the crash.72 Both the fuel pump
and the aircraft were over twenty years old.7" The lower court
granted the defendants' 4 motions to dismiss under GARA. 7 5
The plaintiff appealed.7"
The plaintiff argued that the Cessna Pilot Safety and Warning
Supplement Manual in the accident craft was within the eigh-
teen-year repose period since it was only 10 years old.77 Plaintiff
claimed that the manual was a "new part" sufficient to toll the
statute because the manual was required to be in the plane and
had a part number.7 ' This argument failed because the court
found the manual merely descriptive and not specific to the air-
craft in question.79 Additionally, the court could not find a link
between the manual and the accident because the type of acci-
dent had no causal link to the warnings in the manual.8"
The plaintiff's next argument was that the overhaul of the fuel
pump only two years before the accident qualified the pump as
a "new part."'" This argument also failed because the fuel pump
was not alleged to have caused the accident.82 Plaintiffs claims
against Lear Romec were barred due to GARA.83 The plaintiff's
next creative argument outlined that Teledyne must be respon-
sible for the defects in the Teledyne engine and the engine-
driven fuel pump, even if Teledyne did not manufacture the
fuel pump.84 Teledyne moved for summary judgment, which
was granted because the plaintiff provided no evidence that the
engine, without the fuel pump, caused the accident.15
71 Id. at *1.
72 Id.
73 1d.
74 The defendants were the following: Cessna Aircraft Company, the aircraft
manufacturer; Lear Romec, the fuel pump manufacturer; and Teledyne Conti-
nental Motors, the engine manufacturer. Id. at *1.
75 Id.
I7 ld. at *2.
77 Id. at *13.
78 Id.
79 Id.
8( Id. at *14.
81 Id. at *6.
112 Id. at *7.
83 Id.
14 Id. at *8.
85 Id.
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The plaintiff was successful, however, with the reversal of the
summary judgment granted on behalf of Cessna as to her know-
ing misrepresentation or concealment claim. 6 She was success-
ful here because she could show that Cessna knowingly
increased the horsepower and decreased the aeronautical drab
during its single engine testing phases to show that a pilot could
control the aircraft with one engine inoperative, as required by
aviation regulations."' The court found that a triable factual dis-
pute existed as to whether Cessna misrepresented the plane's
single-engine performance capabilities to the FAA."
IV. CONCLUSION
GARA is the aviation industry's tort reform. Its youth is slowly
eroding with each new case published interpreting GARA's pa-
rameters. Our obligation in the legal aviation industry is to
shape this "teenage" statute into "good law." Only time will tell
the extent to which a fair balance has been reached between the
preclusion of plaintiffs' claims and the development of the gen-
eral aviation industry. For now, all we can do is forge on: we are
certainly in for an interesting ride.
86 Id. at *11.
87 Id.
8 Id. at *11-12.
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GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT
49 U.S.C. § 40101, NOTE
PuB. L. 103-298, AuG. 17, 1994, 108 STAT. 1552, AS AMENDED PUB.
L. 105-102, § 3(E), Nov. 20, 1997, 111 STAT. 2216
Section 1. Short title.
This Act may be cited as the "General Aviation Revitali-
zation Act of 1994."
Section 2. TIME LIMITATIONS ON CIVIL ACTIONS
AGAINST AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in subsection
(b), no civil action for damages for death or injury to
persons or damage to property arising out of an acci-
dent involving a general aviation aircraft may be
brought against the manufacturer of the aircraft or the
manufacturer of any new component, system, subas-
sembly, or other part of the aircraft, in its capacity as a
manufacturer if the accident occurred-
(1) after the applicable limitations period begin.-
ning on-
(A) the date of delivery of the aircraft to its
first purchaser or lessee, if delivered directly
from the manufacturer; or
(B) the date of first delivery of the aircraft to
a person engaged in the business of selling or
leasing such aircraft; or
(2) with respect to any new component, system,
subassembly, or other part which replaced an-
other component, systems, subassembly, or other
part originally in, or which was added to, the air-
craft, and which is alleged to have caused such
death, injury, or damage, after the applicable limi-
tation period beginning on the date of comple-
tion of the replacement or addition.
(b) EXCEPTIONS.-Subsection (a) does not apply -
2006] CARA 423
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(1) if the claimant pleads with specificity the facts
necessary to prove, and proves, that the manufac-
turer with respect to a type certificate or airworthi-
ness certificate for, or obligations with respect to
continuing airworthiness of, an aircraft or a com-
ponent, system, subassembly, or other part of an
aircraft knowingly misrepresented to the Federal
Aviation Administration, or concealed or withheld
from the Federal Aviation Administration re-
quired information that is material and relevant to
the performance or the maintenance or operation
of such aircraft, or the component, system, subas-
sembly, or other part, that is causally related to the
harm which the claimant allegedly suffered;
(2) if the person for whose injury or death the
claim is being made is a passenger for purposes of
receiving treatment for a medical or other
emergency;
(3) if the person for whose injury or death the
claim is being made was not aboard the aircraft at
the time of the accident; or
(4) to an action brought under a written warranty
enforceable under law but for the operation of
this Act.
(c) GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT DEFINED.-For
the purposes of this Act, the term "general aviation air-
craft" means any aircraft for which a type certificate or
an airworthiness certificate has been issued by the Ad-
ministrator of the Federal Aviation Administration,
which, at the time such certificate was originally issued,
had a maximum seating capacity of fewer than 20 pas-
sengers, and which was not, at the time of the accident,
engaged in scheduled passenger-carrying operations as
defined under regulations in effect under part A of
subtitle VII of title 49, United State Code [49 USCS
§§ 40101 et seq.] at the time of the accident.
(d) RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LAWS.-This sec-
tion supersedes any State law to the extent that such
law permits a civil action described in subsection (a) to
424
be brought after the applicable limitation period for
such civil action established by subsection (a).
Section 3. OTHER DEFINITIONS.
For purposes of this Act -
(1) the term 'aircraft' has the meaning given such
term in section 40102(a)(6) of Title 49, United
States Code [49 U.S.C.A. § 40102(a) (6)];
(2) the term 'airworthiness certificate' means an
airworthiness certificate issuedunder section
603(c) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49
U.S.C. 1423(c)) [see 49 U.S.C.A. § 44704(c)(1)]
or under any predecessor Federal statute;
(3) the term 'limitation period' means 18 years
with respect to general aviation aircraft and the
components, systems, subassemblies, and other
parts of such aircraft; and
(4) the term 'type certificate' means a type certifi-
cate issued under section 44704(a) of Title 49,
United States Code [49 U.S.C.A. § 44704(a)], or
under any predecessor Federal statute.
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